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If inquiries are about learning the lessons of the past, why do they appear to find the same 
failings time and again? Bristol, Mid Staffordshire, Morecambe Bay, Liverpool Community 
Health are all examples of where culture went wrong. The lack of learning from inquiries is a 
prominent concern and one raised elsewhere in this issue. In this article, I explore why it 
might be that culture is repeatedly found to be the cause of healthcare failures.  I start by 
reviewing perspectives on what culture is and the degree to which it is possible change it.  I 
examine how culture was described in the Bristol, Mid Staffordshire, Morecambe Bay and 
Liverpool inquiries and question whether these are the same cultures with the same 
problems or whether they are different. I discuss possible explanations for apparent 
similarities, describe how cultural change occurs and conclude by drawing out the 
implications of focusing on culture as a threat to patient safety. 
 
 





It is widely held that inquiries are a means of learning the lessons of the past, with the 
requirement to make recommendations on the lessons to be learned for the wider NHS 
even being written into the inquiry’s terms of reference1.  Yet, questions are repeatedly 
raised about whether inquiries do actually fulfil this aim as there appears to be a recurrence 
of the same themes over subsequent inquiries.  A number of inquiries over the last two 
decades have identified culture to be the cause of healthcare failures, suggesting that 
despite considerable investment of time, money and expertise, effectively tackling the 
problem of culture is yet to be solved.  So where does the problem lie?  In this article, I 
explore what culture is, why it is considered so problematic, and the degree to which we 
can change it. I review how culture featured in Bristol, Mid Staffordshire, Morecambe Bay 
and Liverpool inquiries and explore some of their similarities and differences, before giving 
an example of where there has been cultural change and highlighting the factors that have 
shaped this change. 
 
The problem with culture 
 
The problem with culture would seem to be threefold.  First, there is a widespread lack of 
consensus about the precise meaning of culture.  Different academic disciplines tend to 
understand culture in different ways which creates ambiguity and confusion, but it also 
affects the way the concept is put to use in these different disciplines2.   Second, there is 
also a general dissatisfaction with existing approaches to managing cultural change, and 
impatience with the lack of progress we appear to have made.  The Report of the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, was followed by criticism that 
recommendations about cultural change were ‘somewhat aspirational and broad brush’3.  
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Although the focus for much of the criticism around cultural change, it is fair to say that 
both before and after this report, the process of cultural change has been poorly 
understood.  Indeed, there are competing claims from different academic disciplines over 
whether it is even possible to manipulate organisational cultures to beneficial effect. Finally, 
it is widely understood that cultures are resistant to change because they are deeply 
ingrained in local day-to-day systems and practices as well as being related to wider social 
conditions4.  Further reasons for this resistance to change include the inequalities in power 
and authority, and competing sets of legitimate interests within organisations5.  Inequalities 
in power are relevant in that attempts at change often focus on the attitudes and 
behaviours of individuals at the lowest level of a hierarchy – frontline staff – and thus on 
those with the least capacity to implement change.  Moreover, while frontline staff hold a 
great deal of safety-critical know-how, they are often unable to persuade those higher up 
the hierarchy of the credibility or relevance of their knowledge6.  Competing sets of 
legitimate interests come into play when, for example, new ways of managing quality and 
safety interfere with established ways healthcare professionals deal with risk, ways that 
reflect their respective knowledge and status7. 
 
Given that culture is a complex concept that is understood in different ways, it is necessary 
to look briefly at the most common understandings of culture as this is where part of the 
problem lies; how culture is conceptualised relates to expectations of whether or not it is 
possible to manipulate it.  The most common way of defining culture in healthcare-related 
fields is as the prevailing beliefs, values, assumptions and attitudes of a community, and 
their translation into patterns of behavior, organisational routines and rituals. This 
definition focuses on the tacit knowledge – assumptions, values and beliefs – of a 
community and how that informs people’s behaviours, implying a linear relationship from 
values and beliefs to behaviours.  Culture is often said to operate at different levels, from 
artefacts as visible manifestations of culture, through shared beliefs and values used to 
justify behaviours, to shared, but largely unconscious, expectations and assumptions that 
underpin day-to-day activities8. In anthropology, culture is understood as ‘the shared, overt 
and covert understandings that constitute conventions and practices, and the ideas, 
symbols, and concrete artifacts that sustain conventions and practices, and make them 
meaningful.’9. This definition includes tacit understandings (as well as explicit) but places 
more emphasis on how those understandings become manifested in ‘concrete artifacts’ 
such as policies and technologies that then sustain practices.  This suggests a relationship 
between knowledge (tacit and explicit), systems and practices that is mutually constitutive, 
rather than one (knowledge) preceding the other (systems and practices).  Culture, then, is 
both a product and context of social action. 
 
A point of confusion arises from the emphasis definitions of culture have placed on the 
shared understandings, values, practices and so forth.  In a large organisation, just how 
widely are such values shared?  Even within a ward, there are a number of different 
professional groupings and these may hold different values, or the same values to different 
degrees.  Mannion and Davies have described hospitals as ‘a dynamic cultural mosaic made 
up of multiple, complex, and overlapping subgroups with variably shared assumptions, 
values, beliefs and behaviours’10. Hospital cultures, therefore, are not uniform across the 
organisation and encompasses complex links between attitudes, identities and ideas about 
professionalism. 




And as mentioned above, there are different perspectives on whether it is possible to 
manipulate cultures with predictable and beneficial effects.  Anthropologist, Clifford 
Geertz11 insists that ‘culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviors, 
institutions, or processes can be causally attributed; it is a context, something within which 
they can be intelligibly – that is, thickly – described’.  Here, culture is an analytical 
perspective, something that lends actions intelligibility and meaning.  Accordingly, sociology 
and anthropology have tended to conceptualise culture as a tool for social analysis, whereas 
organisational, engineering and human factors disciplines have tended to conceptualise it 
more as a concrete world of beliefs and practices associated with a particular group12 and 
thus something potentially amenable to intervention.  With this debate in mind, I now 
explore how cultures are described in the various inquiry reports. 
 
‘Culture’ in NHS inquiries 
 
What I present below is a distillation of the cultures described in the reports.  All the reports 
gave detailed descriptions of practices and the manner in which they were carried out, but 
these were by no means uniformly enacted by all – some people resisted these practices, 
some raised complaints.  Nevertheless, a sense of the prevailing cultures emerges and it is 
this I seek to convey.  
 
The inquiry that followed events at Bristol Royal Infirmary found the existence of a ‘club 
culture’.  This operated largely at the managerial/board levels and entry to the club was 
dependent on length of service and ‘fit’ with the executive team.  The Chief Executive made 
the final decision on who became a clinical director from among senior clinicians with whom 
he had worked for many years.  Challenges to this policy were perceived as disloyalty.  It 
resulted in all the decision-making power being held by too few individuals.  Exacerbating 
this imbalance of power was the preference for oral communication which meant that those 
who were outside the ‘club’ were unable to trace decisions.  There was a rigid distinction 
between clinical and managerial matters and one which prioritised ‘clinical freedom’.  The 
Chief Executive saw his role as freeing up clinicians to do their job at the bedside and it was 
not for managers to interfere.  Likewise, managers did the managing which meant that it 
was difficult for clinicians to raise concerns if they did not belong to the ‘club’.  There was 
also a paternalistic attitude towards patients, one which sought to ‘protect’ parents from 
too much information.  And teamwork was problematic in that teams were ‘profoundly 
hierarchical’ and made up of single disciplines such as surgeons, anaesthetists or nurses, 
rather than being multidisciplinary and arranged around patient care.   
 
At Mid Staffordshire there was an ‘insidious negative culture involving a tolerance of poor 
standards and a disengagement from managerial and leadership responsibilities’.  There was 
an overwhelming emphasis on finances and achieving Foundation Trust status, and 
inadequate staffing (particularly of nurses) arising from workforce reductions employed to 
meet financial targets.  This resulted in a lack of basic care and tolerance of poor standards 
due to the gradual corrosive effect of working in such difficult environments. Many of those 
giving testimony to the inquiry emphasised that such tolerance resulted from severely 
inadequate staffing over a protracted length of time and that staff would regularly work 
beyond their hours, unpaid, in an attempt to provide adequate care. There was bullying, 
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fear of adverse repercussions and low morale with examples of nurses emerging from bed 
management meetings in tears for fear of losing their jobs.  Consultant staff became 
disengaged from managerial decision-making due to the perception that the raising of 
concerns was not welcome by senior management, and that to do so would risk job 
security.  Moreover, when concerns were raised, the response was generally defensive of 
the Trust leadership’s position; it was characterised as one of ‘immovability’ and often 
accompanied by the platitude that things would improve once foundation trust status had 
been attained.  This led to resignation on the part of the clinicians.  Finally, there was a lack 
of urgency about remedying problems even when they were recognised. 
 
At Morecambe Bay there was a significant degree of tribalism between different staff 
groups, with the working relationships between the midwives, obstetricians and 
paediatricians being insular, disengaged, and characterised by an unwillingness to 
collaborate.  Midwives almost exclusively controlled risk assessment procedures for 
pregnant women and zealously pursued the concept of ‘normal birth’, even on some 
occasions turning away obstetricians when it was clear that problems had developed during 
delivery.  The reluctance to collaborate exacerbated the effects of poor clinical knowledge 
and resulted in poor clinical decisions; obstetricians delivered babies of high-risk mothers in 
the unit (rather than transferring them before birth to better equipped clinical settings) 
against the advice of the paediatricians. Paediatricians, however, were also unwilling to 
transfer babies to other clinical settings; they adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach with babies 
likely to need neonatal intensive care, missing the optimal time for transfer and 
necessitating difficult emergency transfers. The isolation of the maternity unit played a role 
in that, because of its relatively remote location, it was difficult to recruit medical staff and 
many of the non-medical staff had trained at the hospital and worked there ever since.  This 
isolation allowed practice to become detached from the standards and procedures found 
elsewhere. Governance procedures, particularly internal investigations into untoward 
incidents, were inadequate and overly protective of the midwives, often being conducted by 
the maternity risk manager who combined the role with that of a supervisor of midwives – a 
conflict of interest that was unacknowledged prior to the inquiry.  
 
Same or different cultures? 
 
Are these the same cultures, with the same problems?  Should the warning signs have been 
recognised? Or are they different? From my perspective, culture is problematic in each of 
these places, but it is problematic in different ways.  However, at a certain level of 
abstraction, points of contact can be found: poor teamwork resulted in poor clinical 
decisions at Bristol and Morecambe Bay.  However, at Bristol, the discord was largely 
between clinicians in managerial positions and clinicians more generally, in that if you were 
not in the small number of people with power, your concerns would not be heard. And the 
main point of contest was around whether particular surgeons were skilled enough to 
perform particular operations or whether that service should move elsewhere.  At 
Morecambe Bay, non-collaboration was a feature of daily clinical practice in that the 
midwives, obstetricians and paediatricians could not work together and sought to avoid 
doing so wherever possible. 
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Hierarchy was also an issue at Bristol and Morecambe Bay.  At Bristol there existed a 
traditional hierarchical relationship between different staff groups with surgeons at the 
pinnacle, but the deference involved in the traditional arrangement was positively resisted, 
20-30 years later, by the midwives at Morecambe Bay to the point that they actively 
excluded the obstetricians on occasions.  In each of these situations, professional self-image 
worked against teamwork but the way this is manifested in each situation – a complete lack 
of challenge at Bristol and overt interprofessional challenge at Morecambe Bay – is so 
different that it is unlikely staff would identify themselves as exhibiting the same problems. 
 
There are also connections to be found between Bristol and Mid Staffordshire in that senior 
clinical staff were disengaged from managerial decision-making in both locations but this 
came about in different ways.  At Bristol, there was no process of engaging senior clinical 
staff in decision-making, effectively excluding them from those forums, and no expectation 
that anyone else should be involved (the clinical/managerial distinction).  At Mid 
Staffordshire, processes for consultation existed but the problem was one of apathy 
brought about by repeatedly raising concerns to a management that was immovable.  
 
Consequently, these cultures bear some similarity – at a conceptual level – but also many 
differences in the way problematic aspects of culture have come about and the particular 
formation they take, and this makes it more difficult for individuals to recognise themselves 
as exhibiting the same problems as described in earlier inquiries.  Why then are similarities 
so apparent when viewed from the outside? One reason is that during the inquiry process 
particular events and practices are extracted out of day-to-day activity.  They are described 
in sharp focus whereas for the healthcare managers and professionals involved, these 
events are embedded within the blur of daily activity.  Another reason similarities between 
different organisational failures are emphasised is because the interpretation and 
presentation of findings are informed by current understandings of organisational failure 
which provide the concepts and frameworks for explaining failure.  That investigations of 
patient harms are conducted in the light of the most up-to-date knowledge of the causes of 
such harm is of course desirable. What this does, however, is highlight certain aspects of the 
situation and describe them in similar terms using the language and theories of safety 
science.  The way failure is explained then, has a homogenising effect, particularly when the 
detailed investigations get distilled into key messages, bullet points and news headlines. The 
point is that talking in general terms of ‘culture’ is too simplistic; it erases complexity, 
highlights similarities and downplays differences.  But downplaying differences between 
sites means that warning signs appear more obvious, self-evident even, to an external point 
of view.  
 
There are, however, occasions when failures of care resonate so strongly with a previous 
case that it would seem their similarities cannot be accounted for only by the above 
explanations. This was indeed the case with Liverpool Community Health Trust. Here, there 
was an intolerant and bullying leadership culture.  Inexperience of the leadership and an 
overly ambitious cost-improvement programme aimed at attaining foundation trust status 
led to ‘a culture of intolerance, disbelief and fear, with a clear lack of care for the 
workforce.’  This focus on financial savings resulted in dramatic reductions in frontline staff 
and an inability to deliver care to a sufficient and safe standard. The response to safety 
incidents was bullying and resistant to the suggestion of an underlying cause connected 
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with staffing levels.  Meetings were conducted in an intimidating and bullying manner that 
involved addressing staff inappropriately by shouting and finger-pointing, and staff felt 
blamed for incidents that occurred.  When staff raised concerns, there were repeated 
accounts of staff being suspended without being told why, or what the next steps would be.  
In some cases, these suspensions lasted for many months without any apparent process for 
resolution. This contributed significantly to a climate of fear and insecurity among Trust 
staff.  
 
The similarities with Mid Staffordshire are undeniable, at least at the leadership and 
managerial levels.  However, one does not get the same sense of tolerance of poor 
standards as at Mid Staffordshire, quite the opposite. On reading the report, it seems as 
though front-line staff do not share the leadership culture at all, one gets a sense that if only 
the leadership would change, frontline staff would feel enormous relief at the prospect of 
once again being able to practise safely.  Although similar in nature, the problems at 
Liverpool Community Health Trust come across as more extreme than at Mid Staffordshire: 
the cost improvement programmes even more ambitious, the willingness of the leadership 
to bully and intimidate more overt, denial that the cause of the problems had anything to 
do with cuts in resources and shortage of appropriately trained staff more absolute, and the 
deleterious effects this had on staff well-being more palpable.  So, in this case the warning 
signs were recognisable and it would seem that staff did so: they could clearly see the 
shortcomings in the care they delivered and suffered the effects of having to work in these 
exceedingly difficult circumstances.  Here, staff did attempt to resist the leadership culture 
and to raise concerns, but they were effectively suppressed by a significant level of bullying, 
intimidation and harassment.  Therefore, if the warning signs were recognised but changing 




As mentioned above, it is widely acknowledged that cultures are difficult to change as they 
are deeply connected with both day-to-day systems and practices within a workplace but 
also tied to external bodies (such as professional bodies and the standards and guidelines 
they set), as well as being related to wider social conditions such as policy contexts and 
societal expectations of healthcare.  However, this perspective does not convey culture 
entirely accurately.  It suggests that culture is immovable and yet, these things, both inside 
and outside the workplace, are continually evolving, in small, incremental and diffuse ways.  
There is staff turnover, local policies get updated, new technologies are introduced, 
leaderships change, new professional guidance is issued, political and policy contexts shift 
and as do societal expectations.  Culture is a product of all these things, so in this sense, 
culture is changing all the time. However, these things do not necessarily change at the 
same time or rate, and so the things that are slower to change can seem to anchor certain 
elements of culture in place.  
 
I would like to briefly give an example of where I think there has been cultural change.  At 
Bristol, care was based on a paternalistic approach to families and the support they needed. 
There was the impression that informing parents and gaining their consent to treatment 
was regarded as a chore by the surgeons and that ‘the prevailing view was that parents 
should be protected from too much information.’13  Consequently, in the report it was 
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suggested that healthcare should be based on partnership rather than paternalism and that 
patients should be involved wherever possible in decisions about their treatment and care.  
 
With one caveat, discussed below, the paternalism found at Bristol does not feature in the 
descriptions of culture in any of the subsequent inquiries.  I am not suggesting paternalism 
no longer exists in medicine, but that it exists to a much lesser degree than it did.  Yet, 
important though the Bristol inquiry was, the recommendations were not the only spur 
towards a cultural shift away from paternalism.  There has been movement on a number of 
levels both inside and outside medical practice; there was a growing appreciation within 
medicine about the need for shared decision-making and evolving professional guidance 
reflects this.  But the time period covered by the inquiry (1984-1995) was a time when the 
internet was in its infancy and yet to transform the landscape of health information.  Since 
then, access to health information and expectations that patients would consult sources 
other than healthcare professionals have changed dramatically.  Although increasing health 
literacy may be unevenly distributed and difficult to achieve for some, there has 
nevertheless been a cultural shift in the level of understanding expected of and by patients 
towards being more informed. Thus, culture can and does change over time, but it may be 
that changes are required both inside and outside of an organisation and this can be difficult 
to control. 
 
However, the caveat mentioned above, relates to whether the midwives’ actions at 
Morecambe Bay can be considered paternalistic.  Although not described as paternalism in 
the inquiry report, Dr Kirkup points out (personal communication) that the dismissal of 
patient and family concerns and the insistence on normal birth demonstrates an 
authoritative attitude characteristic of paternalism.  Perhaps there has not been such 
movement on paternalism after all when midwives, who understood themselves to be 
upholding the philosophy of normal birth and protecting patients from the harm associated 
with unnecessarily medicalised births, overrule patients and commit alternative harms.  
Although, it should be noted that Morecambe Bay is possibly peculiar in the extent to which 
this stance was adopted. Indeed, it was stated that the isolation of the maternity unit played 
a role in its failure to keep pace with the standards and practices of midwifery units 
elsewhere.   
 
Despite the lingering legacy of paternalism, culture can still be said to have changed when 
midwives adopt problematic characteristics previously associated with doctors.  This raises a 
further problematic issue about cultural change – that the direction of change is difficult to 
control.  Studies have shown that interventions have unanticipated – and sometimes 
counterproductive – effects14.  Accordingly, there is a growing body of sociological work that 
questions the assumption that culture will respond in predictable ways to intervention.  
Hillman and colleagues15, for example, illustrate how the implementation of a falls 
reduction target on an elderly care ward unintentionally created ‘a culture of restriction and 
limitation where patients were encouraged to remain in their chairs and use bedpans or 
commodes rather than be helped to a toilet’; a culture that undermined the independence, 
dignity and well-being of patients rather than serving it. 
 
In line with the tendency in healthcare to define culture in terms of the values, beliefs and 
attitudes of groups of people, as discussed above, much of the focus for cultural change has 
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been on the values and attitudes held by staff.  Use of a cultural assessment tool to give a 
measure of performance for benchmarking and planning of quality improvement was 
amongst the recommendations put forward in the Report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust Public Inquiry.  However, there are questions about the sensitivity of such 
tools to measure change16 and reservations more generally about the effectiveness of 
interventions that encourage people to think and feel differently17.  Moreover, culture is not 
uniform across an organisation and the values staff hold do not map neatly onto practices; 
the case of Liverpool Community Health Trust, discussed above, vividly demonstrates the 
distress staff suffered when the leadership culture forced them to practise in ways they 
knew were damaging to patients. 
 
It may be necessary to relinquish the attempt to fix culture as if it were an independent 
variable and to accept incomplete control in the direction of cultural change.  
Conceptualising culture as a thing in itself is unhelpful when it depends on and is shaped by 
many factors, both inside and outside the workplace, and over which workers, managers 
and organisations may have little control.  It was suggested in the Kennedy Report that 
problems ‘should be seen as responses to circumstances.  Change the circumstance and 
there is the prospect of resolution.’  On the basis of the foregoing discussion, this would 
seem to be a more fruitful approach.  Rather than thinking about culture as a whole, it may 
be better to identify certain problematic elements of practice, and to focus on changing the 
circumstances that produce these practices, ascertaining and resolving the factors that 
anchor them in place, for example, competing priorities or tribal interdisciplinary working 
relationships.  Changing the constituent parts of culture will result in cultural change but 
large-scale, visible shifts can take many years and may need to be accompanied by broader 
professional, political, technological or societal change.  Moreover, any attempt at change is 
likely to have unintended consequences as well as, or in place of, those changes that were 
anticipated and so changes to practices should be accompanied by evaluations of the 




What does it do to talk about culture? Introducing culture into theories of explanation for 
organisational failure has provided a vocabulary to talk about the manner in which practices 
happen, to describe how they happen and to appreciate the effects this has. As at  
Liverpool, for example, there were designated meetings in which to discuss safety issues, 
but the interrogation, blame, and finger pointing without any acknowledgement that the 
problem was due to inadequate staffing, meant this forum was to be avoided if possible and 
ineffective at improving safety when it was used.  Talking about culture also gives us an 
understanding of the degree to which the manner of approaching issues is shared across the 
organisation – not uniformly but widely.  Therefore, it has helped to shift the emphasis from 
identifying individuals who do wrong to practices in which many people are implicated, and 
to exploring the context for those practices.   
 
Nevertheless, when we talk about culture in broad terms, and lose the detail and the 
context, this foregrounds similarities and differences are pushed to the background. Using 
the same language, concepts and frameworks for explanation has a homogenising effect, 
conveying the message that it is the same problem over and again.  This is not an entirely 
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negative effect as it helps to galvanise the need for action, and in this way inquiry reports 
can capture the zeitgeist; crystallising the prevailing mood of the time and helping to 
stimulate change.  However, presenting different events as the same does an injustice to 
people working in those environments as it makes warning signs and corresponding action 
seem more obvious.  It also does disservice to the inquiry process in that questions are 
repeatedly raised about the need for such lengthy, detailed and expensive proceedings 
when they seem to result in the same findings.  Moreover, seeing each inquiry as a repeat of 
the last carries the risk of missing opportunities to learn more specific lessons arising from 
the different inquiries. 
 
Finally, talking about culture as it has featured in these different inquiries is helping to 
develop an understanding of cultural change as a gradual, emergent and reflexive process of 
changes to practice and context.  Culture is not an independent variable that responds in 
predictable ways to intervention, so it cannot be managed as such. Appreciating the 
complexity of the task means accepting incomplete control, but it does not mean we have 
no control. The focus should shift towards changing the circumstances, practices, policies 
and priorities that can be changed, and less on the values of staff hold (as the relationship 
between values and practices is not straightforward).  Cultural change will follow, indeed 
culture is continually evolving, the challenge lies in identifying and changing the aspects of 
practice (policies, people, resources, regulations, professional guidance and so forth) that 
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